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Abstract: This paper investigates the measurement error in end dates of fur-
ther training programs in the German Integrated Employment Biographies Sample
(IEBS) to gain insights on how measurement error in end dates of treatments a￿ects
evaluation results and on how to deal with this problem in future studies using the
IEBS. Error-proneness of end dates in the IEBS is discussed, correction procedures
are introduced and their in￿uence on estimated employment e￿ects is analyzed us-
ing basic descriptive analysis, propensity score matching and a descriptive duration
model. Though there is considerable measurement error in the end dates that can be
corrected, the e￿ect on evaluation results is modest, because for evaluation end dates
are relevant only through indirect channels. The impact on causal e￿ects based on
matching is highest during the lock-in period and for long programs. The advice for
future users of the IEBS is to decide depending on their evaluation design and goal
if an explicit correction of end dates is necessary. In case an explicit correction is
dispensable, it seems still important to take care that program spells are not given
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Appendix 361 Introduction
Large administrative data sets are becoming increasingly available for empirical
research. Not su￿ering from typical non-response and attrition problems, the relia-
bility of administrative data is in some respects superior to survey data. But there
are other problems concerning reliability related to the fact that information is pri-
marily collected for administrative purposes and not for research. An example of
such a problem from the ￿eld of policy evaluation is the information on the end date
of individual participation in a public labor market program in German data. For
the public administration it is necessary to document the assignment to a program,
but it may be of minor importance to carefully register until when the individual ac-
tually attended the program. In consequence the information on the end of program
participation may be unreliable. But regardless of the importance for the admin-
istration, this information may be important for research on program e￿ects. This
paper investigates the error-proneness of end dates of certain programs in the most
important German data for policy evaluation, the Integrated Employment Biogra-
phies Sample (IEBS), and draws conclusions on the consequences of measurement
error in treatment end dates in administrative data for program evaluation.
The Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS) became available recently.
Covering about 1.4 million individuals and rich, daily information on employment,
job search, transfer payments and active labor market programs, this data set is
unique in Germany. It is the basis for the ongoing government conducted evalu-
ation of recent years’ labor market reforms and will probably be used for almost
all empirical studies on labor market policies in Germany in the next years. The
data are considered highly reliable, but end dates of further training programs are
an exception to this. Mostly due to early drop-out, a considerable part of reported
program end dates in the data is later than the end of actual participation. Because
measurement error in end dates may in￿uence standard evaluation results through
several channels, it is di￿cult to predict ex ante how the problem a￿ects results.
But the IEBS has the special advantage that due to its richness and the special
feature of including data from di￿erent administrative processes it is possible to
correct almost all relevant end dates. To give an example, say that the researcher is
confronted with the information that according to the program participation data
a participant takes part in a training program for six months. But the employment
data tells the researcher that the participant starts regular employment one month
after the beginning of the program and the data on transfer payments indicates that
1the payment accompanying the training program also stops after one month. In this
case one way to deal with the contradiction would be to change the program end
date in the participation data to one month after the beginning of the program. As
in the example, it is often possible to exploit di￿erent pieces of information from dif-
ferent sources to correct the program end dates. This study introduces four di￿erent
procedures to deal with the error-prone end dates: a ￿naive￿ approach, a standard
approach and two procedures using correction mechanisms that di￿er slightly from
each other. These four procedures are used to study through which channels and
to what degree upward measurement error in end dates in￿uences estimated em-
ployment e￿ects. Descriptive employment rates, treatment e￿ects using propensity
score matching and a descriptive proportional hazard model are estimated using a
framework with typical properties of evaluation studies like the probability of reg-
ular employment as the outcome, a focus on employment e￿ects from the start of
the program on and the consideration of program e￿ects as opposed to pure threat
e￿ects. There are two aims of this exercise. The ￿rst is to gain knowledge on how to
handle the problem in future studies using the IEBS. The second is to get insights
on how strongly measurement error in end dates of treatments in￿uences evalua-
tion results in empirical studies in general. This might be helpful for studies using
other administrative data sets, which are supposed to su￿er from measurement er-
rors in end dates that cannot be corrected. To the best of my knowledge, there is
no guidance in the literature on this problem.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section two discusses error-
proneness of end dates in the data and possibilities for corrections. Section three
presents the framework for the evaluation, discusses how end dates may in￿uence
results and introduces four procedures to handle the problem. Section four, ￿ve
and six study the impact of error-prone end dates on basic descriptive results, on
matching results and on results using descriptive duration analysis, respectively.
Section seven concludes.
22 Error-proneness and Possibilities to Correct End
Dates of Further Training Programs in the IEBS
2.1 The Integrated Employment Biographies Sample
The Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS) is a new, rich administra-
tive data set. It consists of a 2.2% random sample of individuals data drawn from
the universe of data records collected in four di￿erent administrative processes.2
The individuals in the IEBS are thus representative for the population made up by
those who have data records in any of the four administrative processes. In sum the
2.2% sample includes about 1.4 million individuals and about 17 million spells. The
data contains detailed daily information on employment subject to social security
contributions, receipt of transfer payments during unemployment, job search, and
participation in di￿erent programs of active labor market policy. Thus the IEBS is
particularly useful to evaluate di￿erent parts of German active labor market policies
in detail. It is the data set that is used for the evaluations of the so called Hartz-
Reformen, several major labor market reforms of recent years. It is also used in
other evaluation studies currently in progress.3 Many other studies using the IEBS
will certainly follow as the data set is unique in Germany concerning its largeness
and richness in detailed information and as it will be updated in the future to always
include recent years.
The IEBS collects information from four di￿erent administrative sources: the
Employment History (Besch￿ftigten-Historik), the Bene￿t Recipient History
(Leistungsempf￿nger-Historik), the Supply of Applicants (Bewerberangebot), and
the Data Base of Program Participants (Ma￿nahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatenbank).
The ￿rst data source, the Employment History, consists of social insurance register
data for employees subject to contributions to the public social security system.
It covers the time period from 1990 to 2004. The main feature of these data is
detailed daily information on the employment status of each recorded individual.
In evaluation studies this information can be used to account for the labor market
history of individuals as well as to measure employment outcomes. Each employment
spell contains, in addition to start and end dates, information on personal as well
2For detailed information on the IEBS see Hummel et al. (2005) and Bender et al. (2005). This
study uses a version of the IEBS that has been supplemented with additional information.
3See Biewen et. al. (2006) and Lechner and Wunsch (2006).
3as job and ￿rm characteristics such as wage, industry or occupation.
The Bene￿t Recipient History, the second data source, includes daily spells of all un-
employment bene￿t, unemployment assistance and subsistence allowance payments
individuals in our sample received between January 1990 and June 2004. It also
contains information on personal characteristics, on sanctions and periods of dis-
quali￿cation from bene￿t receipt. The Bene￿t Recipient History is important as
it provides information on the periods during which individuals were out of em-
ployment and therefore not covered by the Employment History. In particular, the
Bene￿t Recipient History includes information about the exact start and end dates
of periods of transfer receipt.
The third data source included in the IEBS is the so-called Supply of Applicants,
which contains diverse data on individuals searching for jobs. The Supply of Appli-
cants data cover the period January 1997 to June 2004. The spells include detailed
information concerning job search, regional information and personal characteristics,
in particular on educational quali￿cations, nationality, and marital status. They also
provide information on whether the applicant wishes to change occupation, how
many job proposals he or she already got, and about health problems that might
in￿uence employment chances.
The fourth and ￿nal data source of the IEBS is the Data Base of Program Partici-
pants. This data base contains diverse information on participation in public sector
sponsored labor market programs like training programs, employment subsidies and
many more covering the period January 2000 to July 2004. This paper focuses on
medium and long term further training (Ma￿nahmen zur F￿rderung der beru￿ichen
Weiterbildung). Similar to the other sources, information comes in the form of spells
indicating the start and end dates at the daily level, the type of the program as well
as additional information on the program such as the planned end date, whether
the participant entered the program with a delay, and whether the program was
successfully completed.
2.2 Error-proneness of End Dates in the Program Data
The reliability of the data was checked very carefully by Bender et al. (2004,
2005b). They ran extensive consistency checks of the records coming from the dif-
ferent sources, making use of additional information on the data generating process
provided by the Institute for Employment Research. In addition, experts in local
4labor agencies have been consulted and examples in the data have been discussed.
Concerning calendar dates, their conclusion is that start and end dates in the em-
ployment and bene￿t data are very highly reliable.4 The reasons for this seem to be
that start and end dates of employment spells are directly relevant for contribution
rates and therefore indispensable for the administration. Information on the start
and the end of transfer payments are, at the administrative level, directly linked to
￿ows of bene￿t payments. Dates seem to be less reliable in program participation
data and job search data.5 A particular problem are the end dates of further train-
ing programs, a considerable part of which is not correct. But end dates of program
participation are often necessary to de￿ne the participation in the program to be
evaluated.
There are several reasons why end dates of program participation spells are error-
prone. First, the correct reporting of end dates of program participation is not so
important for administrative purposes, because the information is not necessarily
relevant for payments (Bernhard et al. 2006, p. 5). On the contrary other dates,
like for instance the end of bene￿t spells, are directly relevant for the payment and
thus much more important for the administration and as a conclusion more reliable
in the data. Second, the end of program participation often changes after the date
is ￿rst registered. This can be due to drop-out of the program, non-attendance,
change of course or shift of the course. If then the registered date is not corrected
or if the correction does not reach the data set provided to the researcher, the end
date of participation in the IEBS will be incorrect. The concurrence of these two
circumstances seems to be responsible for most of the errors. Third, program end
dates are registered by hand, which may cause mistakes especially because they
often lie far in the future. Considering that program spells are almost never found
too short in the data, but often too long, the third problem seems to be of minor
relevance, because typing errors would lead to errors in both directions.6
4Concerning other aspects of the data, they come to the conclusion that the variable that
indicates the status of the spell is very reliable in all four sources. Information in the employment
data and the bene￿t data that is needed for administrative purposes is very reliable (for instance
wage and transfer payments) but information not directly needed in the administration is less
reliable in these sources. Fitzenberger, Osikominu and V￿lter (2006) discuss imputations of the
education variable in the IABS, another data set including information of the Employment History.
Personal information seems to be better in the job search and program participation data sources.
5For job search data the measurement error seems to be quite severe, but it is possible to
circumvent this problem by de￿ning the labor market status using bene￿t and employment data.
6Start dates are more reliable than end dates, probably because drop-outs are irrelevant and
because they lie in the nearer future, so that fewer changes occur. In case of non-attendance start
5Given these reasons program end dates will always be a sensitive part of adminis-
trative evaluation data in Germany (also for measures other than further training
programs) and countries with comparable administrative structures. There are two
aspects determining the reliability. One is how and when information is registered
during the administrative process itself. The other one is what rules the providers
of the data use to de￿ne which piece of information of the administrative data bases
will ￿nally appear in the scienti￿c data set as the program end date.7 These rules
have changed between the IEB versions 2 and 3 used in the studies currently avail-
able (2.05 is used in this study) and version 4 which is just becoming available.
In the versions before version 4 the start date is taken from the ￿rst record 8, i.e.
the information drawn when a participation spell ￿rst appears in the administrative
data basis. The end date is taken from the ￿nal record, i.e. the information that
is collected in the ￿rst draw occurring after the end date of the program. If for
some reason there is no ￿nal record the end date is taken from the ￿rst record and
thus equal to the so called planned end date (Hummel et al. (2005) and Kruppe
and Oertel (2003)). Since version 4, the participation data come from the so called
Datenbank ISAAK V.1.03. Here the end date is always taken from the information
with the latest record date except this date lies later than one year after the program
end. If the information on the end date in the record with the latest date is missing,
it is taken from the record with the earliest date.9 Thus a major di￿erence be-
tween the rules seems to be that there is no distinction between ￿rst record and ￿nal
record any more but the date of the record is important. Other di￿erences probably
occur due to the new ISAAK system itself. The change of procedure implies an
improvement in the reliability of end dates for some cases, but new problems arise.
A comparison of the end dates that are false according to the correction mechanisms
suggested in this paper with version 4.0 suggests that 70% of these end dates remain
incorrect. A ￿rst look at examples with inconsistencies has shown that new errors
occur. Therefore it is not clear ex ante whether the new rules will reduce or augment
the error-proneness of the end dates. This paper studies implications of end date
correction in version 2, which the studies currently available use, but the correction
procedures might as well be used for version 4.
and end dates are per de￿nition incorrect. In this case the correction of the end date leads to
non-participation in a program and thereby also to a correction of the start date.
7Jaenichen et al. (2005) analyze some inconsistencies of the participation data that are related
to the end date problem. One of their conclusions is that both aspects are relevant, but the
problems in the registering of the data themselves might be the major problem.
8First record is Zugangsdatensatz and ￿nal record Abgangsdatensatz in German.
9IEB User Manual V. 4, not published.
62.3 Possibilities for Corrections of Program End Dates
Concerning data checks and corrections, the IEBS has a great advantage: the fact
that it includes four administrative data sources can be exploited to check plausi-
bility and correct implausible information. It is thus possible to correct end dates
and to analyze if and how errors in treatment end dates in real data lead to biased
estimation results. This section discusses which information in the IEBS can gener-
ally be used for corrections of program end dates, whereas section 3.3 proposes four
di￿erent ways to deal with the error-prone end dates within a concrete framework
of analysis (which is presented in 3.1) and explains how the corrections in this study
are implemented.
A constellation in the data set that is evidently a contradiction is a regular em-
ployment spell that starts before the end of program participation.1011 Imagine
for instance a retraining program that starts after three months of unemployment.
The spell continues for two years, a typical duration for a retraining program. But
after four weeks, a regular employment spell starts in parallel to the participation
spell. As dates in employment data are much more reliable than in participation
data, the employment information indicates that the correct end date of program
participation is after four weeks of attendance at the latest.
A second major possibility for corrections is provided by subsistence allowance spells.
Subsistence allowance are payments of the labor agency to cover living costs of the
participants of medium and long term further training programs. They are a subsidy
to unemployment bene￿t or unemployment assistance for the time of the program.12
With very few exceptions discussed later, all participants of medium and long term
further training programs receive subsistence allowance for the complete time of
the program (sometimes plus the weekend after the end of the program), a fact that
proves true in the data. Dates of subsistence allowance spells are very reliable. Thus,
if a subsistence allowance spell ￿nishes before a program spell, one can conclude that
the end date of the program spell is wrong.13
10To be eligible for further training, a person has to be unemployed. In theory, it is possible to
be partly unemployed if one loses one of several jobs and is still registered as unemployed, but the
number of these part time unemployed is almost zero.
11In this paper regular employment is de￿ned as non-minor unsubsidized employment on the
￿rst labor market with a minimum length of two weeks.
12Short term training is not analyzed in this paper.
13Information on subsistence allowance has been used by Bender et al. (2005a) as an important
piece of information for the de￿nition of program participation in the eighties and nineties, a time
7Third, in very rare cases, the living costs of participants are covered by an apprentice
wage payed by a ￿rm. The apprentice wage spell may be used in the same way as
a subsistence allowance spell for corrections. Furthermore, among the additional
variables in our version of the data, we have a variable indicating that some did
never attend and a variable indicating the date if someone signed o￿ before the
regular end of a program. These two variables are often missing, but used with
caution (for instance only if they do not contradict with information on subsistence
allowance) they can help to correct the end dates in some cases.
There is other information in the data one might be tempted to use, but which would
lead to a false correction in some cases. This is for instance the length of program
spells. The law provides certain rules for the length of certain programs, but despite
of this in practice there exist - though rarely - much longer programs. Therefore
one should not change end dates in the data just because a spell is surprisingly
long. While regular employment parallel to training programs is a contradiction,
employment of a few hours only is possible (Bernhard et al. 2006, p. 24) and
must not be used for the correction of program spells. Some participants receive
aid from the European Social Fund (ESF). This fonds allows ￿exible combinations
of ESF programs, normal programs accompanied by ESF allowance and subsistence
allowance. Therefore neither the ESF spells themselves nor subsistence allowance
spells in connection with ESF spells are safe to use for corrections, because for
instance an ending subsistence allowance spell together with a continuing ESF pro-
gram spell is not necessarily inconsistent. For technical reasons it happens, though
very rarely, that program participation is split into di￿erent spells in the data that
can even overlap. Therefore di￿erent participation spells should better be connected
instead of deleting part of them.14 Information originating from the so called class
data base are risky to use, because this information might be merged wrongly to
the participant data.15
for which the Data Base of Program Participants is not available.
14For proposals how to deal with this problem see Jaenichen et al. (2005).
15Class data - as opposed to participant data - is on the courses themselves. It is merged to the
participant data using a course identi￿er, which is not completely reliable.
83 Procedures to Handle Error-prone End Dates in
Evaluation
3.1 Treatments and Sample
This section introduces the framework of the analysis, discusses how measurement
error in the end dates may in￿uence evaluation results within this framework and
introduces four di￿erent procedures to handle error-prone end dates. The focus of
this paper is on two di￿erent treatments: further training and retraining. Further
training (FT) is a medium length training program lasting usually several months.
In classroom or in a practice ￿rm, new professional skills are trained and existent
knowledge is updated. Retraining (RT) leads to a new degree within the German vo-
cational training system, it typically lasts two years. Other public sector sponsored
programs, like short term training or wage subsidies, are not evaluated, but they are
considered within the multiple framework by excluding individuals attending these
programs from the control group.16 In this study the e￿ect of participating in a
program (as opposed to a possible threat e￿ect of the announcement to be assigned
to a program) shall be evaluated and therefore programs are counted only if the
unemployed has participated a minimal amount of days. The limit has been set
considering program aims and the distribution of planned program durations to 28
days for further training and 181 days for retraining.
For the rest of this paper, the focus is on an in￿ow sample into unemployment
consisting of individuals living in West Germany who became unemployed between
the beginning of February 2000 and the end of January 2002 after having been
continuously employed for at least three months. Entering unemployment is de-
￿ned as quitting regular employment and subsequently being in contact with the
labor agency (not necessarily immediately) either through bene￿t receipt, program
16In the relatively rare case where one person has several (completed or uncompleted) partici-
pation spells within one unemployment spell, the spells are connected if there are at most 14 days
in between two spells. If this concerns two di￿erent programs (for instance short term training
and retraining), the connected spell is assessed as the more important program (retraining in the
example). If a person participated in several programs within one unemployment period with an
interruption of more than two weeks, the ￿rst program is evaluated. Subsistence allowance spells
without any accompanying spell in the Program Participation Data Base are not counted as an
FT or RT program in this study, because they are irrelevant for the analysis of the end dates of
the Program Participation Data Base.
9participation or a job search spell.17 In order to exclude individuals eligible for
speci￿c labor market programs for young people and individuals eligible for early
retirement schemes, only persons aged between 25 and 53 years at the start of their
unemployment spell are considered. This framework leads to a data set with 52653
unemployment periods (45740 individuals) under consideration.18 9% of the indi-
viduals experience more than one considered unemployment period. 39% of the
unemployment spells are unemployment periods of females, the average age is 37
years at the beginning of an unemployment spell. 20% of the considered unem-
ployed take part in a public sponsored labor market program within the ￿rst year
of unemployment. About 3700 of these individuals take short term training, 2700
individuals a training program considered in this paper and about 3800 individuals
participate in a di￿erent program (like for example subsidized employment).
3.2 Relevance of Program End Dates for the Estimation of
Employment E￿ects
There exist several studies on measurement error in the treatment variable. Molinari
(2005) develops limits for treatment e￿ects in the case that the treatment variable
has missings in survey data. Battistin and Sianesi (2006) characterize the bias
if treatment status is mismeasured and provide bounds. Lewbel (2004) develops
GMM estimators for the scenario that the treatment variable is measured with error
and an instrument that in￿uences the probability of treatment but is conditional
independent of the misclassi￿cation probabilities and the average treatment e￿ect is
available. For the case where no such instrument is available bounds are developed.
The problem analyzed in this paper is di￿erent in two respects. First, the problem
itself is more complicated, because not the treatment indicator is mismeasured but
the program end dates. Measurement error in end dates can a￿ect the treatment
indicator but it may also a￿ect the results through other channels as discussed below.
But second, using the IEBS data it is possible to correct the end dates. Therefore
the approach of this paper is to develop procedures to correct the end dates and then
to analyze through which channels and to what extent wrong end dates in￿uence
results.
17Note that this implies that the same individual may appear more than once in the evalu-
ation sample. Approximately ten percent of the individuals are represented by more than one
unemployment spell according to the above de￿nition.
18These numbers di￿er slightly depending on how one deals with parallel program and employ-
ment spells when preparing the data. The given numbers are valid for the standard procedure.
10Through which channels upward measurement error of end dates potentially in-
￿uences employment e￿ects depends on the evaluation design and the estimation
method. Using descriptive employment rates or matching, program end dates have
no direct e￿ect on the results but may bias them indirectly through outcome mea-
surement and through the treatment indicator. First, if the outcome is measured
as regular employment or non-employment (including every other status including
program participation), too late end dates of programs lead to a contradiction: the
researcher observes program spells and regular employment spells in parallel for
some time. A decision whether to count this time as employment or program par-
ticipation (and thus non-employment) is necessary and will in￿uence employment
rates and treatment e￿ects. Second, end dates de￿ne the actual length of program
participation, which can be relevant for the decision if a program has been attended
long enough to be counted for evaluation. Too late end dates can lead to measure-
ment error in the treatment indicator: it may indicate participation, although it
should indicate non-participation, as in reality the participant did not attend long
enough. Measurement error in the end dates in￿uences the results more directly in
estimation designs in which it is of importance if a participant is in a program at a
certain point in time and thus the end date directly enters the estimation or in which
it is relevant whether a program has been completed or not. This is for example
the case if attending an uncompleted program and having attended a program in
the past are considered separately using duration analysis.19 In conclusion, there
exist di￿erent channels through which measurement errors in program end dates
may bias evaluation results, but the end date does not enter the estimation directly
(for instance as a regressor) and it is therefore di￿cult to predict the direction and
magnitude of a potential bias.
3.3 Four Procedures to Deal with Error-prone End Dates
To see how error-prone end dates a￿ect estimation results and if correcting the end
dates changes the results, descriptive analysis and the estimation of employment
e￿ects is pursued with uncorrected and corrected end dates. But as there are two
ways how to prepare the data that seem to be natural if one does not correct end
dates and also two slightly di￿erent ways how to correct end dates that seem equally
adequate, not only two but four procedures how to deal with the problem of error-
19Measuring treatments by dose (for instance using days of treatment as a treatment variable)
is another framework in which the end date is of direct importance, but only if dose is measured
in realized duration and not in planned duration.
11prone end dates are introduced.
3.3.1 Procedure 1
The underlying idea of procedure 1 is that program participation is the most im-
portant information in a data set mainly created for evaluation studies. Therefore
participation spells are taken as they are in the data. If a participation spell con￿icts
with a regular employment spell, the participation spell is given priority. This rule
is implemented for the measurement of the outcome, but also for the measurement
of the labor market status before the relevant unemployment period in case that
a former program spell con￿icts with a regular employment spell. Procedure 1 is
called the ￿naive￿ procedure, because a close look at examples in the data reveals
that dates of employment spells are more reliable than end dates of program spells.20
3.3.2 Procedure 2
In procedure 2 regular employment spells are given priority in case they con￿ict
with program spells. The rationale is that employment dates in the IEBS are very
reliable, because the length of the spells is directly relevant for pension payment.
The rule to give priority to employment information is applied for measurement
of the outcome as well as measurement of labor market status before the relevant
unemployment period in case of con￿ict, that is in those cases where the researcher
is forced to take a decision. But note that no ex ante correction of the program
end dates is implemented. This implies that for the decision whether a program has
been attended or attended long enough, the participation spells are taken as they
are in the original data.21 Procedure 2 is called the standard procedure, because it
seems to be the best choice if one does not want to implement an explicit correction
mechanism, but is convinced of the reliability of employment data.
20One hint for this is for instance, that subsistence allowance and employment spells almost
never con￿ict, whereas it occurs quite often that end of program spells do not ￿t with the end of
subsistence allowance. Another hint are examples in which several annual employment spells follow
each other in a regular way, while the program spell is still continuing in parallel. Furthermore,
Bernhard et al. (2006, p. 46) advise the researcher to give priority to employment spells.
21Remember from section 3.1 that program spells with a gap shorter than 14 days are connected.
123.3.3 Procedure 3
Procedure 3 works as procedure 2, but in addition a mechanism to correct end
dates of participation spells for further training programs is implemented at the
beginning of the data preparation. This works as follows: the ￿rst step of the
correction mechanism uses regular employment for correction. To de￿ne periods
of regular employment, spells of non-minor unsubsidized employment with positive
wage are connected and overlapping spells are consolidated. If regular employment
starts before the end of a program participation spell, program spells are assigned
the date of the start of the employment spell minus one day, which is the last possible
day of program attendance, according to what we know from the data. Eventually
this assigned date will be used to cut o￿ the program spell.
The second step prepares the use of subsistence allowance spells for correction. Fur-
ther training spells are marked, if there is no reason (like ESF or an apprenticeship
spell) that the participant should not - for the whole program or not at all - have
received subsistence allowance. In these cases correction using subsistence allowance
spells would be too risky, because combinations of di￿erent payments are possible
in these cases. Next, subsistence allowance spells are connected. After this, the
programs that should be funded in theory and have subsistence allowance spells in
the data that start about the same time as the program itself are assigned the end
date of the connected subsistence allowance spell. This date indicates the last day
the participant has been in the program according to the bene￿t information. As a
third step, the same is done for the rare further training programs for which living
costs are covered by apprenticeship wages.
From these three steps, program spells can be assigned at most two dates. If two
end dates are assigned, the ￿rst is almost always the end of subsistence allowance
and the second the beginning of regular employment some time later. The earlier
one is chosen as the new program end date, because it marks the end of partici-
pation (in the very rare case with no subsistence allowance but the beginning of
regular employment as the new end date, the new end date indicates when program
participation ￿nished at the latest, it is unknown when it exactly ￿nished). The end
date is replaced in the original data set.22
As a further correction, programs that have not been attended according to the
additional variables ￿program success: non-attendance￿ or have a too early date
in the variable ￿signed-o￿ at￿ are recoded to no program. Because the reliability of
22No other changes in the data are used later.
13these variables seems to be restricted, they are only used if there is no information on
subsistence allowance, ESF or an apprenticeship spell, which is already an indication
that the program has not been attended.
3.3.4 Procedure 4
Procedure 4 works as procedure 3, with the only di￿erence that the ￿rst step in
the correction mechanism - the ex ante correction due to regular employment - is
not pursued. This means that in the rare case without information on subsistence
allowance and no correction using the variables ￿program success: non-attendance￿
or ￿signed-o￿ at￿, the end date is not corrected even if regular employment starts.
But as in procedure 2 and 3, employment still dominates participation if they con￿ict
for the measurement of outcome or the time before unemployment. As a result the
di￿erence between procedure 3 and procedure 4 is that in the latter, too short
participation will not be assessed as non-participation if the program is too short
only with an end date correction using employment spells.
On the one hand it can be argued that procedure 4 is better than procedure 3, be-
cause procedure 3 is biased in the following way: unsuccessful participants will never
have their end date corrected by the ex ante correction using employment spells, be-
cause per de￿nition they have no regular employment spells starting before the end
of the program. If there exists drop-out of unsuccessful participants not registered
in the data and not uncovered by other correction steps, unsuccessful candidates
will be over-represented in the treatment group. This leads to a downward bias of
the treatment e￿ect. But on the other hand one might also argue that Procedure
3 is preferable, because it makes as many reliable corrections as possible with the
IEBS data. Thus, for applications it depends on the context (if as many dates as
possible should be corrected or if it is more important to prevent any bias) whether
to choose procedure 3 or procedure 4 and therefore both procedures are used in this
study.
144 Impact on Participation Rates and Employment
Rates
4.1 Impact on Continuing Attendance on a Program
Figure 1 shows the rate of participants of RT (FT respectively) who are still attend-
ing an RT (FT respectively) program in the relevant month.23 Month zero is the
month in which the programs start, thus the participation rate is 100%. In each ￿g-
ure there is a graph for each of the four procedures.24 The graphs for RT show that
most participants stay in the program for 18 to 24 months, but some stay even 36
months in an RT program. About 20% of the participants leave their RT program
within the ￿rst 18 months by dropping out. The individuals taking FT stay in the
program much shorter, after 10 months the large majority has left the program. The
di￿erences between the procedures are larger for RT than for FT, because RT is the
longer program and therefore the number of months where di￿erences may occur is
higher for RT, but the directions of the di￿erences are the same. For RT at month
18 procedure 1 suggests the highest participation rate. This is because in procedure
1 program spells are counted, if they con￿ict with employment spells. Thus par-
ticipants who are already in employment, but still have a (wrong) program spell,
are counted as participants. Figures 2 and 3 are just another way of presenting the
results, they show the di￿erences of the graphs of ￿gure 1. The biggest di￿erence be-
tween procedure 1 and 2 appears in the months before the end of the typical planned
length of the programs, because at that time the number of deviations between re-
ported end dates and true end dates reaches its maximum. The participation rates
of procedure 2, 3 and 4 are similar, here two e￿ects compensate each other. On
the one hand the corrections of procedure 3 and 4 prevent that drop-outs are still
counted as participating after dropping out. This causes a lower participation rate
for procedure 3 and 4. The e￿ect is quite small because it is only relevant as long
as the individuals are unemployed, because once they enter employment they are
counted as employed and thus not as program participant using procedure 2, 3 or 4.
On the other hand the corrections provoke that more RT program spells are shorter
23Not the ex ante length of a program is shown, but the validation of the outcome according to
the procedures. This implies that for procedure 2, 3 and 4 a month with a regular employment
spell and a program spell is counted as a month in employment and not in a program.
24No con￿dence intervals for participation rates and employment rates are given, because the
focus of the descriptive analysis in this section is to give an idea how and through which channels
the choice of the procedure may in￿uence the analysis.
15than six months (one month for FT) and therefore not counted, which leads to a
non decreasing graph for the ￿rst six months (one month for FT) for procedure 3
and a slowly decreasing graph for procedure 4. The graph for procedure 2 decreases
from the beginning on, because there are programs that are not corrected ex ante
and therefore valid, but according to the rules of procedure 2 once an employment
spell starts, this is counted as employment (and not as program participation any
more). In procedure 4 some program spells shorter than six months occur, because
there is no ex ante correction using employment spells. These short programs not
being in the sample, the program participation rate is higher for procedure 3 (and
to a lower extent for procedure 4) than for procedure 2 in the beginning.
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4.2 Impact on Employment Rates of Participants
4.2.1 Graphical Evidence
In the following the impact of the di￿erent procedures on the employment rates of
participants is discussed, because the channels how the di￿erent procedures in￿uence
results are analyzed easiest in studying descriptive evidence. Figures 4 and 5 show
the employment rate of RT and FT participants respectively for each month before
and after the beginning of treatment (month zero) for each of the four procedures.25
Figures 6 and 7 are again just another way of presenting the results by showing the
di￿erences of the graphs of ￿gures 4 and 5.
Procedure 1 underestimates the employment rate up to six percent points as com-
pared to procedure 2. This is because when measuring the outcome, program partic-
ipation spells are given priority to regular employment spells. Figures 6 and 7 show
that the magnitude of the e￿ect is almost the same for FT and RT, but the period
where di￿erences occur - when program spells are wrong due to early drop-out of
some participants - is longer for RT participants.
Using a correction mechanism results in a slightly smaller employment rate than
the standard procedure (procedure 2). The measurement of the outcome is the
same for procedure 2, 3 and 4, thus the di￿erence in the employment rate must
be due to di￿erences in the validation of programs. In procedure 4 program spells
are corrected (using mainly subsistence allowance spells) and therefore more non-
25For later months participation rates might be a little underestimated, because employment
data of year 2004 is not yet complete.
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attenders and very early drop-outs are not counted as participants. As ￿gure 6
shows, this leads to a lower employment rate of participants, which indicates that
non-attenders and very early drop-outs on average have higher employment rates.
The employment rate using procedure 3 is even lower, which must be the case,
because the di￿erence between procedure 3 and 4 is that procedure 4 does not use
employment spells for ex ante correction. Those spells that are corrected due to
starting regular employment spells and that are not in the treatment group for
this reason have a higher employment rate per de￿nition. Figures 6 and 7 show
the di￿erences in detail. According to Procedure 2 the employment rate of RT
participants is up to 1 percent point higher than the employment rate according to
procedure 4 and two percent points higher than the employment rate according to
procedure 3. These di￿erences are smaller for FT participants. Di￿erences between
procedure 2 and 4 last longer than di￿erences to procedure 1, because the former
are due to selection e￿ects and the latter are due to outcome measurement.
194.2.2 Details on the Impact of the Corrections
This section shows in detail how the di￿erent procedures in￿uence results within
the given framework. The intention is to give a better understanding of how the
procedures work and how measurement error in end dates may bias results. There
are 2631 valid treatments using procedure 2. The end dates of only 1,9% of these
treatments may not be checked with a correction procedure. Thus, it is possible to
check almost all relevant participation spells. Only for 50 relevant spells the end
date can neither be con￿rmed nor corrected. Some of these are programs funded
by the European Social Fund (ESF) for which a check and, if relevant, correction
would be possible but does not seem safe enough. Some of these 50 programs were
probably not attended, but this cannot be decided for sure and therefore the original
data are kept as they are. It might also be the case that the subsistence allowance
spell is missing in the ￿nal data set. In sum, the correction procedure leaves almost
no open cases.
Table 1 gives the number of valid unemployment spells, valid FT and RT treatments
and the duration of the corrected and consolidated program spells for each procedure.
There are less valid employment spells using procedure 1 due to the condition of
entering unemployment out of three months of employment. This condition is met
a little less often in procedure 1, because also participation in earlier programs
dominates earlier employment spells. Less programs are valid in procedure 3 than
in procedure 4 and even less in procedure 2, because the more corrections are done,
the more program spells are a￿ected by the minimum attendance criterion. If the
durations of the program spells are compared considering only those that are valid
in every procedure, obviously the average length is shorter the more corrections are
pursued, irrespective if the length of the consolidated spell itself or the length of the
spell until the beginning of a regular employment spell is considered. Considering
the average length of those programs valid in the respective procedure, but not
necessarily in all procedures, sample di￿erences make this picture less clear.
Concerning the employment rates, ￿rst consider the di￿erences between procedure
1 and procedure 2. The major part of the di￿erence is due to the di￿erent handling
of contradictions when measuring the outcome as explained above. This clearly
leads to a downward bias in employment rates and treatment e￿ects for procedure 1
as compared to procedure 2, where regular employment always dominates program
spells. For 7.8% of the treatments valid in all procedures regular employment starts
on average ￿ve months before the end of the original program spell. In addition to
20Table 1: Programs in the Di￿erent Procedures
Procedure 1 2 3 4
Valid unemployment spells 51840 52539 52528 52539
Valid FT treatments 1918 1948 1928 1935
Valid RT treatments 673 683 642 664
Average duration FT 216.61 216.83 204.82 206.79
... for programs always valid 217.01 215.16 203.82 205.39
... and until employment only 217.01 206.63 203.02 203.02
Average duration RT 733.92 724.69 699.18 706.67
... for programs always valid 738.67 735.51 701.09 713.03
... and until employment only 738.67 713.01 698.17 698.94
Program duration is the ex ante program length of the consolidated program spell. This is di￿erent
from ￿gures 1 to 3 where the outcome in the relevant month is shown and thus for procedures 2, 3
and 4 employment spells that dominate program spells when measuring the outcome are already
considered. Thus for ￿gures 1 to 3 the length of the program spell until employment is relevant.
this, new programs and contradicting employment spells may start later on.26
Second, consider the di￿erences between procedure 2 (the standard procedure) and
procedure 4 (with corrections but without ex ante cutting o￿ program spells due
to employment spells), which can be explained through sample di￿erences only,
because the measurement of the outcome is the same. Some program spells which are
wrongly classi￿ed as long enough without corrections are too short to be evaluated
or not attended when using corrections. In other words, the treatment indicator
will in some cases indicate participation using procedure 2 and non-participation
using procedure 4. The descriptive evidence suggests that the employment rate
is lower with corrections, so these ￿drop-outs￿ or ￿non-attenders￿ seem to be more
successful on average. If they are also more successful when controlling for selection,
the treatment e￿ect will be upward biased without corrections. But the sample
di￿erences are very small. While end dates change quite often due to corrections
(out of the 2589 valid treatments in procedure 2 and 4, 12.4% (322) have an earlier
end date due to correction) and the corrections are often quite severe (on average
103 days, 52 days is the median, 10% have corrections less than 2 days and 5%
26Minor di￿erences between procedure 1 and 2 can arise from di￿erences in the sample of valid
unemployment spells. If there is a valid unemployment spell in both procedures, di￿erences in
the validity of programs may evolve because of di￿erent spell consolidation, but they are rare (16
programs are valid in procedure 1 and not in 2 and 7 programs are valid in procedure 2 but not in
procedure 1).
21more than 407 days), only very few corrections in￿uence the sample and can thus
in￿uence the employment rates.27 Due to the corrections only, 42 treatments valid in
procedure 2 are not valid in procedure 4 (31 due to correction based on subsistence
allowance, 9 due to an early signing-o￿ date before the regular end of a program and
1 due to the indicated non-attendance). In conclusion, this shows that a considerable
amount of end dates is corrected, but this correction has few implications, because
the end dates in￿uence the results only through the minimum length criterion, which
is rarely concerned by the corrections. Only very few corrections have an indirect
in￿uence through sample changes because of the minimal length criterion.
Third consider Procedure 3, which involves an additional ex ante correction using
employment spells compared to procedure 4. Due to this 1,16% of the treatments
in procedure 4 are not valid in procedure 3.28 These are per de￿nition treatments
that lead to employment. Thus employment rates and treatment e￿ects estimated
using procedure 3 will be slightly lower compared to procedure 4.
5 Impact on Treatment E￿ects Using Matching
5.1 The Method
In this section the impact of the four procedures on treatment e￿ects using matching
methods is studied. The matching approach used here is the one used in Biewen et
al. (2006) and Fitzenberger et al. (2006). The approach uses a multiple framework
as proposed by Lechner (2001) which in the case of this paper allows to estimate the
e￿ect of FT and RT separately against non-participation (de￿ned here as partici-
pating neither in FT nor in RT nor in any other public sector sponsored program).
Because Frederikson and Johansson (2003, 2004) show that a purely static match-
ing approach leads to a biased estimator in settings where participants may start
a program at di￿erent times during their unemployment spell and if program par-
ticipation is relatively frequent, Biewen et al. (2006) estimate treatment e￿ects
conditional on the elapsed unemployment duration (discretized to several months)
at the start of the program building on the ideas of Sianesi (2003, 2004). Here, to
study the implications of error-prone end dates, the average treatment e￿ect of the
27The overall sum of corrections in the data is of course much higher. Here only those programs
relevant as treatments in the framework of this study are considered.
28Of those 2570 programs that are valid in procedure 3 and 4, 3,27% are further corrected in
procedure 3, on average 140 days (median 62 days).
22treated (ATT) for West German women starting an FT or RT program within the
￿rst three months of their unemployment period against not taking a program at
least until then is estimated. Individuals not starting any program during these ￿rst
three months are in a ￿waiting￿ state because they are not treated at this point but
may be treated later. The outcome variable is the probability of regular employ-
ment. Thus the e￿ect estimated here may be interpreted as the employment e￿ect
of taking the respective program instead of taking no program within the ￿rst three
month of unemployment for those taking the program. The evaluation starts at the
beginning of the program, because this is when programs start to have e￿ects on
the probability of employment of participants and because the end of the program
may be endogenous.
To estimate the counterfactual outcome, matching based on the propensity score is
used. The counterfactual is estimated by local linear matching on the propensity
score and the calendar month of the start of the unemployment spell. As the kernel
function in the local linear regression a product kernel is used. Because the relevant
control groups are very large, matching on the calendar month is exact, while the
bandwidths for the propensity score are calculated by the Silverman rule of thumb.29
The propensity scores are estimated using a probit. A large variety of characteristics
of person, family, region and last job as well as health status, proxies for motivation,
employment history and the number of job proposals are considered. For each
estimation a separate speci￿cation is chosen according to the signi￿cance of variables
and the balancing test of Smith and Todd (2005). The standard errors are computed
using bootstrapping (40 replications).30
5.2 Impact of the Di￿erent Procedures on Employment Ef-
fects
To see how the di￿erent procedures in￿uence the treatment e￿ects using the match-
ing approach presented above, ￿gures 8 to 13 show the average treatment e￿ect on
the treated for women in West Germany participating in FT or RT respectively
during the ￿rst three months of their unemployment spell versus non-participation
in a public sector sponsored program at that time. For the number of available
29The estimation procedures used in this section have been implemented in Stata by Aderonke
Osikominu. Many thanks to her for the permission to use them for this study.
30For the estimation details see Biewen et al (2006). They use a leave-one-out crossvalidation
procedure for the bandwith choice, which does not seem necessary for the purpose of this study.
23observations for this subgroup see table 3 in the appendix. The estimation method
uses all available observations. The outcome variable is the probability of regular
employment at the respective month after the start of the program. The solid lines
represent the treatment e￿ects for di￿erent procedures. The months in which all
persons are unemployed are not shown (section within the vertical lines). Month
zero is the start of the program. The dashed lines show the 95% con￿dence interval.
Note that the con￿dence intervals are valid for the check whether the treatment
e￿ect is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero and not whether the procedures di￿er.
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Legend: procedure 2 in black and procedure 1 in grey.
Figures 8 and 9 show that, during the time when many participants are in the
program and the treatment e￿ects are negative (lock-in-e￿ect), treatment e￿ects
both for FT and for RT di￿er remarkably if one uses procedure 1 instead of procedure
2. For FT, Procedure 1 overestimates the lock-in-e￿ect about 5.28 percentage points
at month 6 where the di￿erence reaches its maximum and the average treatment
e￿ect on the treated (ATT) is -17.23% (10.60 percentage points for RT in month 19
at an ATT of -30.80). In the positive area of the treatment e￿ects, when participants
have ￿nished the program, there are almost no di￿erences for the two procedures
(2.75 percent points when the treatment e￿ect is positive for the ￿rst time for FT and
1.24 percent points for RT respectively). This is because the di￿erence is mostly due
to di￿erent priorities in the measurement of the outcomes and these are irrelevant
once the programs have ￿nished even according to the wrong end dates (except if
participants start new programs). The bias in the treatment e￿ect during the lock-in
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Legend: procedure 2 in black and procedure 1 in grey.
period caused by procedure 1 is relevant for instance if some aggregated treatment
e￿ect is calculated for cost bene￿t analysis.
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Legend: procedure 2 in black and procedure 3 in grey.
Figures 10 and 11 show how the results using procedure 3 di￿er from using procedure
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Legend: procedure 2 in black and procedure 3 in grey.
2. The di￿erences for FT are negligibly small (maximum 1 percentage point at a
treatment e￿ect of -14.51% in month 7). For RT they are a little larger (maximum
2.41 percentage points at a treatment e￿ect of -31.89 % in month 13). The treatment
e￿ect is smaller using procedure 3, indicating that those who drop out because of
corrections (and are thus not in the treatment group using procedure 3) are on
average more successful. According to ￿gure 11 for RT this could be a selection
e￿ect (those not in the treatment group in procedure 3 because of the minimal
length criterion being more successful individuals), because the di￿erence is also
visible before the start of treatment.
Procedure 3 and Procedure 4 lead to (almost) no di￿erence for the FT results and
to a small di￿erence for RT (about 1.4 percentage points maximum). The direction
of the di￿erence is as expected, those not in the treatment group in procedure 3
compared to procedure 4 are successful per de￿nition.
As a conclusion, using matching with standard features (like the start of evaluation
is the start of the program and using a propensity score), measurement error in end
dates of programs is of relatively little importance, because it in￿uences results only
indirectly as discussed in section 4. An explicit correction of program spells might
be important only for studies which need the exact magnitude of the treatment
e￿ect. But concerning the measurement of the outcome, employment spells should
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Legend: procedure 4 in black and procedure 3 in grey.
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Legend: procedure 4 in black and procedure 3 in grey.
be given priority to program spells (procedure 1 should not be used), otherwise the
magnitude of results may be considerably biased.
276 Impact Using Descriptive Duration Analysis
Apart from matching methods, duration models are very popular for the estimation
of program e￿ects. In this section a simple descriptive model is applied to analyze
whether the di￿erent procedures matter in a duration framework. Focussing on the
duration from the start of unemployment until the start of new regular employment,
a proportional hazard model with a Weibull speci￿cation is used. The sample con-
sists of individuals who participate in the respective program during the ￿rst year of
their unemployment spell and those who do not participate in any program during
the ￿rst year.31 In addition to personal and regional characteristics and information
on the individual’s labor market history that are supposed to in￿uence the haz-
ard rate (see appendix for the ￿nal speci￿cation) three time-varying covariates are
included in the estimation:32 The day an individual enters the program under con-
sideration the dummy variable "lock" changes to one. Once he leaves a completed
program (de￿ned as having participated at least 80% of the planned duration), the
"lock" dummy changes to zero again and a second dummy ("treat￿n") is set to one,
indicating that this individual has ￿nished a program.33 In case the individual leaves
an uncompleted program, "lock" is also set to zero and a third dummy ("postdrop")
is set to one, indicating that the individual has dropped out of a program in the
past.34 The three time-varying dummies (instead of a simple program dummy) are
included to study separately how programs bind the unemployed on the one hand
and the time after a completed program on the other hand. The coe￿cients may not
be interpreted as treatment e￿ects, they just describe some aspects of the complex
process that is going on. Particular problems preventing a causal interpretation are
the potential endogeneity of the program end date and the relation between the
dummies "lock" and "treat￿n".
To investigate the impact of the correction procedure, this analysis is of interest,
because the program end date is more important for the estimation than in the
31For the de￿nition of program participation see section 3.1.
32A time-varying covariate is interpreted as a measure of the e￿ect of a one unit change in the
covariate at time t on the log hazard (see Lancaster, 1990).
33The last day of a completed program is already considered as "treat￿n" (if the individual
leaves directly to employment), because regarding the e￿ect of a ￿nished program, starting a job
directly after a completed program or having days of unemployment in between is considered the
same given the length of the whole unemployment duration.
34This idea is inspired by Schneider et al. (2005), who distinguish between a lock-in-e￿ect and
a post program e￿ect.
28Table 2: Extract of the results of the PH model, hazard ratios for time-varying
dummies
Procedure 1 2 3 4
lock Men FT 0.061*** 0.090*** 0.163*** 0.144***
(1043) (1055) (1048) (1051)
(30) (44) (77) (68)
lock Women FT 0.086*** 0.129*** 0.291*** 0.261***
(879) (896) (884) (888)
(27) (39) (86) (77)
lock Men RT 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.036*** 0.0128***
(361) (370) (342) (357)
(3) (6) (18) (7)
lock Women RT 0.006*** 0.034*** 0.073*** 0.051***
(313 ) (314) (299) (308)
(2) (10) (21) (15)
treat￿n Men FT 1.213*** 1.241*** 1.174*** 1.204***
(943) (931) (841) (853)
treat￿n Women FT 1.829*** 1.831*** 1.669*** 1.718***
(811) (814) (731) (744)
treat￿n Men RT 2.050*** 2.371*** 2.055*** 2.425***
(342) (348) (300) (325)
treat￿n Women RT 4.585*** 5.524*** 4.434*** 4.987***
(294) (287) (248) (263)
postdrop Men FT 0.991 0.142 0.879 0.885
(79) (80) (130) (130)
postdrop Women FT 0.711 0.794 0.745* 0.750*
(41) (43) (67) (67)
postdrop Men RT 1.645 1.336 0.699 0.766
(16) (16) (24) (25)
postdrop Women RT 0.672 0.716 1.126 1.128
(17) (17) (30) (30)
Legend: *signi￿cant at 10% level, **signi￿cant at 5% level, ***signi￿cant at 1% level. Signi￿cance
relates to being di￿erent from zero and does not mean signi￿cance of di￿erences between the
procedures. The numbers in brackets are the number of individuals that are in this state for at
least one day of their duration. The second brackets of "lock" give the numbers of individuals who
do only reach "lock", that is leave to employment (or are censored) out of an un￿nished treatment.
The whole number of individuals varies from about 16000 to 27000.
29analysis of section 4.2 and 5, where the di￿erence between procedures 2, 3 and
4 is only relevant for the question whether a treatment is valid. In the duration
framework presented above, in￿uence of the end date of a program on the results is
still indirect, as the end date itself is neither regressor nor outcome variable. But
measurement error in the end date may lead to measurement error in the covariates
(for some days or for the remaining duration in case a program is wrongly assessed
as having been completed), the coe￿cients of which be shall interpreted.35
Table 2 shows the hazard ratios (the exponentiated coe￿cients) for the dummies
"lock", "treat￿n" and "postdrop" for men and women, FT and RT programs for
West Germany for the four procedures. For the coe￿cients, including those of the
additional covariates and standard errors see appendix. A hazard ratio of 0.16 for
"lock" means that the hazard rate for those being currently in an un￿nished program
is just 16% of the hazard rate of those not being in a program. As one would expect,
"lock" always has a negative and highly signi￿cant e￿ect, attending a non ￿nished
program comes along with a drastic reduction in leaving unemployment. This is also
visible from the numbers in the brackets. Whereas 1048 men enter an FT program
(procedure 3), only 77 end their duration out of the uncompleted program. Using
the procedures with less or no corrections, much less individuals are assessed to end
their duration out of an un￿nished program. This in￿uences the hazard ratios of
"lock": they di￿er up to 4.3 percentage points between procedure 1 and 2 and up
to 16.2 percentage points between procedures 2 and 3. Thus the di￿erence between
procedures 2 and 3 is more important than between 2 and 1.
The large majority of those assessed to take a program ￿nish it and "treat￿n" has
always a signi￿cant positive e￿ect on the hazard rate. As discussed above, this is not
to be interpreted as a positive treatment e￿ect, it just says that individuals having
￿nished a program leave unemployment more often than others. In the case of this
analysis, the hazard ratios di￿er a lot between the procedures, for women taking RT
the hazard ratio is 4.585 for procedure 1, 5.524 for procedure 2 and 4.434 for proce-
dure 3, again the di￿erence is larger for procedures 2 and 3 than for 1 and 2. The
reason is that a procedure without a correction mechanism misclassi￿es individuals
to have ￿nished a program, while they should be classi￿ed as being unemployed after
an un￿nished program or leaving to employment out of an un￿nished program (as
one can also see from the numbers in brackets). A second e￿ect is, that in procedure
35A Cox model would be less suitable for the intention of this study, because time-varying
covariates play a role only for the estimation at failure and not during the unemployment duration.
Thus, for instance a too late switch of "lock" from one to zero would not matter, in case the
individual does not leave unemployment in between.
302 too many individuals are assessed as leaving directly out of an un￿nished program,
while in reality they have left the program even before and should be classi￿ed to
"postdrop" equal to one and "lock" equal to zero. This e￿ect leads c.p. to a too high
hazard ratio of "lock" and a too low hazard ratio for "postdrop" using procedure 2.
The coe￿cients of "postdrop" are not signi￿cant.
In sum, the results show that measurement error in end dates has a larger e￿ect
on results in a framework in which the channel through which measurement error
in￿uences results is more important than in the matching approach of section 5.
In the above duration framework the end date a￿ects the results, because it is of
importance if a program has been completed and also if someone starts employment
out of an un￿nished program or some time after having dropped out. Measurement
error in end dates changes in this analysis the magnitude but not the direction of
the results.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the error-proneness of end dates of further training programs in
the IEBS with two aims: to gain insights on how to handle this problem in future
studies using the IEBS and on the more general question how measurement error in
end dates of treatments a￿ects evaluation results. Mainly due to early drop-out not
corrected in the data, a considerable part of end dates of further training programs
are later than the actual end of participation. But the IEBS includes information
that can be used to correct these end dates. In this paper four procedures how to
deal with the error-prone end dates are presented, a ￿naive￿ procedure, a standard
procedure and two slightly di￿erent correction mechanisms. The in￿uence of the
di￿erent procedures on evaluation results is studied using descriptive attendance
and employment rates, matching and a simple descriptive duration model. This
analysis shows that upward measurement error in end dates in￿uences evaluation
results through di￿erent channels, but only indirectly. Because the in￿uence is
indirect, it has only minor e￿ects on the results if matching is used. There is almost
no e￿ect of error-prone end dates on treatment e￿ects after the end of the program
but a considerable e￿ect on the size of the negative employment e￿ect during the
lock-in period and in particular for very long programs. This bias for the lock-in
e￿ect may for example be relevant if one is interested in averaging treatment e￿ects
for cost bene￿t analysis. The e￿ect of measurement error in the end dates is larger,
but does not change the direction of the results, if a duration framework with a
31distinction between the time in an uncompleted program and after a program is
used. The overall small e￿ect of error-prone end dates on evaluation results is good
news for researchers using administrative data sets which are likely to su￿er from
similar problems without having the advantage to correct end dates. The advice
for future users of the IEBS is to avoid using the so called ￿naive￿ procedure which
gives priority to program data. An explicit correction of end dates does not seem
necessary for standard evaluation, except if interest lies in the exact size of the
lock-in e￿ect.
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35Appendix
Table 3: Number of Observations used in the Matching Example*
Procedure 1 2 3 4
No treatment within the ￿rst
three months
18383 18620 18628 18625
FT treatment 354 364 364 365
RT treatment 202 203 194 200
*Women in West Germany starting a program or no program respectively within the ￿rst three
months of unemployment.
Table 4: Variables Used in the Final PH Speci￿cation
Name De￿nition
lock whether an individual is currently attending the pro-
gram under consideration
treat￿n whether a person has participated in the program under
consideration and has completed the program
postdrop whether a person has participated in the program under
consideration but did not complete it
agegroup1 age in between 25 and 29 years
agegroup2 age in between 30 and 34 years
agegroup3 age in between 35 and 39 years
agegroup4 age in between 40 and 44 years
countemp number of days in regular employment within the last
three years before the beginning of unemployment
lnwaged log of daily wage in the last job(s) before the beginning
of the unemployment spell, zero if above or below social
security threshold
dcountub whether receipt of unemployment bene￿t within the last
three years before the beginning of unemployment
dcountua whether receipt of unemployment assistance within the
last three years before the beginning of unemployment
countoos number of days out of sample within the last three years
before the beginning of unemployment
36Name De￿nition
countsub number of days of subsistence allowance within the last
three years before the beginning of unemployment
ur_qb unemployment rate in the individual’s home district in
the calendar year before the beginning of unemployment
foreigner citizenship not German
region2 to region5 classi￿cation of the districts of residence according to
local labor market conditions in 5 groups (four ￿lled for
West Germany)
health2 health problems, but considered without impact on
placement
health3 health problems, considered with impact on placement
quali￿cation1 no degree
quali￿cation2 vocational training degree
schooling2 Hauptschulabschluss or Mittlere Reife /Fachoberschule
(degrees after completion of the 9th or 10th grade)
schooling3 Fachhochschulreife or Abitur/Hochschulreife (degrees
reached after completion of the 12th or 13th grade)
family2 living alone
family3 not married, but living together with at least one person
family4 single parent
family5 married
child at least one child
parttime person worked less than full-time in the last job
industry1 to industry6 industry of last employment in 6 categories
whitecollar2 previous employment was a white-collar job
occchange2 person wishes to work in the same occupation as in the
last employment
quarter1 to quarter9 quarter of the calendar of the end of the last employment
from 2/2000 to 1/2002
motivationlack within the last three years there is information, that the
person did not appear regularly at the labor o￿ce, on
lack of cooperation, availability or similar
problemgroup participation in a program with a social work component
within the last three years
37Table 5: Coe￿cients of PH Model Procedure 1
Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
lock -2.804 (0.183)¤¤¤ -2.451 (0.193)¤¤¤ -5.525 (0.707)¤¤¤ -5.051 (0.707)¤¤¤
treat￿n 0.193 (0.043)¤¤¤ 0.604 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.723 (0.083)¤¤¤ 1.523 (0.085)¤¤¤
postdrop -0.009 (0.141) -0.342 (0.230) 0.498 (0.334) -0.397 (0.409)
agegroup1 0.517 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.169 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.491 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.129 (0.032)¤¤¤
agegroup2 0.448 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.156 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.433 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.125 (0.031)¤¤¤
agegroup3 0.326 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.198 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.325 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.203 (0.030)¤¤¤
agegroup4 0.256 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.280 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.260 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.268 (0.031)¤¤¤
countemp 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤
lnwaged 0.040 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.051 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.046 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.051 (0.015)¤¤¤
dcountub 0.315 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.328 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.323 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.322 (0.024)¤¤¤
dcountua -0.178 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.152 (0.034)¤¤¤ -0.166 (0.025)¤¤¤ -0.118 (0.034)¤¤¤
countoos 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.00009 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.0001 (0.000)¤
countsub 0.0002 (0.000)¤ 0.0002 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.000)¤ 0.0002 (0.000)
ur_qb -1.544 (0.187)¤¤¤ -1.175 (0.262)¤¤¤ -1.539 (0.189)¤¤¤ -1.078 (0.264)¤¤¤
foreigner -0.108 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.109 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.105 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.114 (0.033)¤¤¤
region3 0.192 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.038 (0.027) 0.197 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.032 (0.027)
region4 0.222 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.153 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.227 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.142 (0.035)¤¤¤
region5 0.377 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.205 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.387 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.222 (0.030)¤¤¤
health2 -0.302 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.298 (0.047)¤¤¤ -0.292 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.308 (0.048)¤¤¤
health3 -0.521 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.438 (0.053)¤¤¤ -0.529 (0.039)¤¤¤ -0.454 (0.054)¤¤¤
quali￿cation1 -0.203 (0.044)¤¤¤ -0.038 (0.048) -0.193 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.029 (0.049)
quali￿cation2 -0.093 (0.042)¤¤ -0.018 (0.044) -0.068 (0.043) 0.006 (0.045)
schooling2 0.079 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.036 (0.040) 0.055 (0.024)¤¤ 0.024 (0.040)
schooling3 0.026 (0.036) 0.115 (0.048)¤¤ 0.016 (0.036) 0.114 (0.049)¤¤
family2 0.604 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.843 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.632 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.887 (0.032)¤¤¤
family3 0.616 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.709 (0.055)¤¤¤ 0.640 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.706 (0.056)¤¤¤
family4 0.385 (0.096)¤¤¤ 0.608 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.351 (0.099)¤¤¤ 0.624 (0.045)¤¤¤
family5 0.676 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.546 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.691 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.567 (0.032)¤¤¤
child 0.192 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.188 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.193 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.190 (0.026)¤¤¤
parttime 0.050 (0.037) -0.113 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.043 (0.038) -0.118 (0.025)¤¤¤
industry1 0.229 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.251 (0.073)¤¤¤ 0.234 (0.037)¤¤¤ 0.265 (0.073)¤¤¤
industry2 -0.176 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.172 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.157 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.177 (0.031)¤¤¤
industry4 -0.020 (0.019) 0.078 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.025 (0.019) 0.076 (0.024)¤¤¤
38Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
industry5 -0.011 (0.023) 0.015 (0.028) 0.011 (0.023) 0.042 (0.029)
whitecollar2 0.182 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.083 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.161 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.060 (0.026)¤¤
occchange2 0.290 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.208 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.293 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.220 (0.026)¤¤¤
quarter1 -0.058 (0.031)¤ -0.074 (0.043)¤ -0.075 (0.031)¤¤ -0.053 (0.044)
quarter2 -0.256 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.148 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.243 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.158 (0.039)¤¤¤
quarter3 -0.278 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.129 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.266 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.119 (0.035)¤¤¤
quarter4 -0.125 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.053 (0.033) -0.117 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.048 (0.033)
quarter5 -0.001 (0.022) -0.073 (0.033)¤¤ -0.007 (0.022) -0.059 (0.033)¤
quarter6 -0.258 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.116 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.249 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.122 (0.037)¤¤¤
quarter7 -0.320 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.128 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.325 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.122 (0.036)¤¤¤
motivationlack -0.116 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.044 (0.032) -0.104 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.060 (0.033)¤
problemgroup -0.046 (0.044) -0.166 (0.068)¤¤ -0.057 (0.044) -0.165 (0.069)¤¤
_cons -6.259 (0.096)¤¤¤ -5.568 (0.122)¤¤¤ -6.292 (0.097)¤¤¤ -5.594 (0.124)¤¤¤
Table 6: Coe￿cients of PH Model Procedure 2
Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
lock -2.398 (0.151)¤¤¤ -2.048 (0.161)¤¤¤ -4.582 (0.447)¤¤¤ -3.389 (0.317)¤¤¤
treat￿n 0.216 (0.043)¤¤¤ 0.605 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.863 (0.079)¤¤¤ 1.709 (0.083)¤¤¤
postdrop 0.031 (0.138) -0.231 (0.219) 0.290 (0.354) -0.334 (0.409)
agegroup1 0.520 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.170 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.492 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.124 (0.032)¤¤¤
agegroup2 0.452 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.161 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.437 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.125 (0.030)¤¤¤
agegroup3 0.327 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.203 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.326 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.202 (0.030)¤¤¤
agegroup4 0.260 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.290 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.265 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.276 (0.031)¤¤¤
countemp 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤
lnwaged 0.050 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.050 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.055 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.052 (0.015)¤¤¤
dcountub 0.319 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.324 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.327 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.322 (0.023)¤¤¤
dcountua -0.183 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.146 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.169 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.120 (0.034)¤¤¤
countoos 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.00009 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.0001 (0.000)¤
countsub 0.0002 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.000)
ur_qb -1.921 (0.186)¤¤¤ -1.570 (0.262)¤¤¤ -1.944 (0.188)¤¤¤ -1.604 (0.264)¤¤¤
foreigner -0.107 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.110 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.102 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.106 (0.033)¤¤¤
region3 0.183 (0.020)¤¤¤ 0.029 (0.027) 0.188 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.023 (0.027)
region4 0.206 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.139 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.210 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.127 (0.035)¤¤¤
region5 0.359 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.185 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.370 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.200 (0.030)¤¤¤
39Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
health2 -0.290 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.291 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.281 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.311 (0.048)¤¤¤
health3 -0.520 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.435 (0.052)¤¤¤ -0.528 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.463 (0.053)¤¤¤
quali￿cation1 -0.206 (0.044)¤¤¤ -0.041 (0.048) -0.206 (0.045)¤¤¤ -0.037 (0.049)
quali￿cation2 -0.099 (0.042)¤¤ -0.023 (0.043) -0.082 (0.043)¤ -0.004 (0.044)
schooling2 0.073 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.038 (0.040) 0.051 (0.024)¤¤ 0.025 (0.040)
schooling3 0.025 (0.036) 0.118 (0.048)¤¤ 0.017 (0.036) 0.114 (0.049)¤¤
family2 0.591 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.833 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.620 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.877 (0.032)¤¤¤
family3 0.593 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.694 (0.055)¤¤¤ 0.617 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.690 (0.056)¤¤¤
family4 0.355 (0.095)¤¤¤ 0.596 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.324 (0.098)¤¤¤ 0.603 (0.044)¤¤¤
family5 0.667 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.538 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.681 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.552 (0.032)¤¤¤
child 0.192 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.184 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.192 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.189 (0.025)¤¤¤
parttime 0.048 (0.037) -0.106 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.041 (0.037) -0.117 (0.024)¤¤¤
industry1 0.236 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.253 (0.073)¤¤¤ 0.245 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.268 (0.073)¤¤¤
industry2 -0.172 (0.019)¤¤¤ -0.170 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.153 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.175 (0.030)¤¤¤
industry4 -0.014 (0.019) 0.080 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.018 (0.019) 0.081 (0.024)¤¤¤
industry5 -0.001 (0.023) 0.015 (0.028) 0.021 (0.023) 0.039 (0.029)
whitecollar2 0.181 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.088 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.162 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.058 (0.026)¤¤
occchange2 0.290 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.211 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.292 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.217 (0.026)¤¤¤
quarter1 -0.047 (0.031) -0.062 (0.043) -0.064 (0.031)¤¤ -0.042 (0.044)
quarter2 -0.241 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.142 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.231 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.151 (0.038)¤¤¤
quarter3 -0.270 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.122 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.259 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.105 (0.035)¤¤¤
quarter4 -0.120 (0.022)¤¤¤ -0.057 (0.032)¤ -0.114 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.055 (0.033)¤
quarter5 0.002 (0.022) -0.065 (0.032)¤¤ -0.005 (0.022) -0.054 (0.033)
quarter6 -0.249 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.112 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.243 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.111 (0.036)¤¤¤
quarter7 -0.319 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.127 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.324 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.113 (0.035)¤¤¤
motivationlack -0.109 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.047 (0.032) -0.097 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.063 (0.032)¤
problemgroup -0.049 (0.040) -0.123 (0.060)¤¤ -0.058 (0.041) -0.085 (0.061)
_cons -6.247 (0.096)¤¤¤ -5.518 (0.121)¤¤¤ -6.277 (0.097)¤¤¤ -5.518 (0.124)¤¤¤
Table 7: Coe￿cients of PH Model Procedure 3
Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
lock -1.814 (0.114)¤¤¤ -1.235 (0.108)¤¤¤ -3.298 (0.243)¤¤¤ -2.621 (0.219)¤¤¤
treat￿n 0.161 (0.046)¤¤¤ 0.512 (0.049)¤¤¤ 0.720 (0.088)¤¤¤ 1.490 (0.093)¤¤¤
postdrop -0.129 (0.112) -0.291 (0.175)¤ -0.358 (0.317) 0.119 (0.268)
40Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
agegroup1 0.517 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.169 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.492 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.125 (0.032)¤¤¤
agegroup2 0.449 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.158 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.436 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.121 (0.030)¤¤¤
agegroup3 0.325 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.200 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.325 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.200 (0.030)¤¤¤
agegroup4 0.256 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.285 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.261 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.272 (0.031)¤¤¤
countemp 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤
lnwaged 0.049 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.050 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.054 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.052 (0.015)¤¤¤
dcountub 0.319 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.322 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.326 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.321 (0.023)¤¤¤
dcountua -0.179 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.140 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.164 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.123 (0.034)¤¤¤
countoos 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.00008 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.0001 (0.000)
countsub 0.0002 (0.000)¤ 0.0002 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.000)¤ 0.0002 (0.000)
ur_qb -1.507 (0.185)¤¤¤ -1.752 (0.262)¤¤¤ -1.585 (0.187)¤¤¤ -1.689 (0.264)¤¤¤
foreigner -0.108 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.108 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.105 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.103 (0.033)¤¤¤
region3 0.188 (0.020)¤¤¤ 0.029 (0.027) 0.192 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.025 (0.027)
region4 0.215 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.134 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.216 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.124 (0.035)¤¤¤
region5 0.374 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.184 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.382 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.197 (0.030)¤¤¤
health2 -0.288 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.294 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.280 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.314 (0.048)¤¤¤
health3 -0.515 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.439 (0.052)¤¤¤ -0.524 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.465 (0.053)¤¤¤
quali￿cation1 -0.205 (0.044)¤¤¤ -0.041 (0.048) -0.202 (0.045)¤¤¤ -0.038 (0.049)
quali￿cation2 -0.096 (0.042)¤¤ -0.022 (0.043) -0.079 (0.043)¤ -0.005 (0.044)
schooling2 0.072 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.041 (0.040) 0.053 (0.024)¤¤ 0.031 (0.040)
schooling3 0.021 (0.036) 0.120 (0.048)¤¤ 0.017 (0.036) 0.118 (0.049)¤¤
family2 0.595 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.831 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.624 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.876 (0.032)¤¤¤
family3 0.598 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.691 (0.055)¤¤¤ 0.618 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.692 (0.056)¤¤¤
family4 0.350 (0.095)¤¤¤ 0.591 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.322 (0.098)¤¤¤ 0.604 (0.044)¤¤¤
family5 0.668 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.534 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.685 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.548 (0.032)¤¤¤
child 0.199 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.186 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.197 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.191 (0.025)¤¤¤
parttime 0.047 (0.037) -0.107 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.040 (0.037) -0.116 (0.025)¤¤¤
industry1 0.236 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.245 (0.073)¤¤¤ 0.244 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.263 (0.073)¤¤¤
industry2 -0.169 (0.019)¤¤¤ -0.171 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.150 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.173 (0.030)¤¤¤
industry4 -0.013 (0.019) 0.077 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.016 (0.019) 0.081 (0.024)¤¤¤
industry5 -0.007 (0.023) 0.015 (0.028) 0.015 (0.023) 0.040 (0.029)
whitecollar2 0.180 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.090 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.163 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.062 (0.026)¤¤
occchange2 0.290 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.212 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.292 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.218 (0.026)¤¤¤
quarter1 -0.054 (0.031)¤ -0.056 (0.043) -0.069 (0.031)¤¤ -0.038 (0.044)
quarter2 -0.244 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.141 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.232 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.146 (0.038)¤¤¤
41Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
quarter3 -0.268 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.119 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.261 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.100 (0.035)¤¤¤
quarter4 -0.117 (0.022)¤¤¤ -0.053 (0.032) -0.111 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.050 (0.033)
quarter5 -0.001 (0.022) -0.060 (0.032)¤ -0.005 (0.022) -0.051 (0.033)
quarter6 -0.257 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.108 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.251 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.105 (0.036)¤¤¤
quarter7 -0.322 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.126 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.326 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.114 (0.035)¤¤¤
motivationlack -0.110 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.049 (0.032) -0.100 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.065 (0.032)¤¤
problemgroup -0.055 (0.040) -0.124 (0.060)¤¤ -0.062 (0.041) -0.084 (0.061)
_cons -6.299 (0.096)¤¤¤ -5.510 (0.122)¤¤¤ -6.329 (0.097)¤¤¤ -5.517 (0.124)¤¤¤
Table 8: Coe￿cients of PH Model Procedure 4
Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
lock -1.939 (0.122)¤¤¤ -1.344 (0.115)¤¤¤ -4.361 (0.408)¤¤¤ -2.970 (0.259)¤¤¤
treat￿n 0.185 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.541 (0.048)¤¤¤ 0.886 (0.082)¤¤¤ 1.607 (0.088)¤¤¤
postdrop -0.122 (0.112) -0.288 (0.175)¤ -0.267 (0.302) 0.121 (0.268)
agegroup1 0.517 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.166 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.492 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.121 (0.032)¤¤¤
agegroup2 0.449 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.159 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.436 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.123 (0.030)¤¤¤
agegroup3 0.325 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.202 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.325 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.201 (0.030)¤¤¤
agegroup4 0.257 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.285 (0.030)¤¤¤ 0.263 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.271 (0.031)¤¤¤
countemp 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.001 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0 (0.000)¤¤¤
lnwaged 0.050 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.052 (0.015)¤¤¤ 0.055 (0.010)¤¤¤ 0.053 (0.015)¤¤¤
dcountub 0.319 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.321 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.326 (0.017)¤¤¤ 0.319 (0.023)¤¤¤
dcountua -0.179 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.139 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.164 (0.025)¤¤¤ -0.120 (0.034)¤¤¤
countoos 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.00006 (0.000) 0.0003 (0.000)¤¤¤ 0.0001 (0.000)¤
countsub 0.0002 (0.000)¤ 0.0001 (0.000) 0.0001 (0.000)¤ 0.0002 (0.000)
ur_qb -1.535 (0.185)¤¤¤ -1.629 (0.263)¤¤¤ -1.575 (0.187)¤¤¤ -1.593 (0.266)¤¤¤
foreigner -0.106 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.109 (0.033)¤¤¤ -0.102 (0.021)¤¤¤ -0.102 (0.033)¤¤¤
region3 0.189 (0.020)¤¤¤ 0.027 (0.027) 0.194 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.024 (0.027)
region4 0.216 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.137 (0.034)¤¤¤ 0.216 (0.027)¤¤¤ 0.128 (0.035)¤¤¤
region5 0.374 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.185 (0.029)¤¤¤ 0.384 (0.022)¤¤¤ 0.199 (0.030)¤¤¤
health2 -0.290 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.292 (0.046)¤¤¤ -0.280 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.312 (0.048)¤¤¤
health3 -0.522 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.436 (0.052)¤¤¤ -0.532 (0.038)¤¤¤ -0.462 (0.053)¤¤¤
quali￿cation1 -0.206 (0.044)¤¤¤ -0.033 (0.048) -0.202 (0.045)¤¤¤ -0.028 (0.049)
quali￿cation2 -0.096 (0.042)¤¤ -0.014 (0.043) -0.078 (0.043)¤ 0.006 (0.044)
schooling2 0.073 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.040 (0.040) 0.053 (0.024)¤¤ 0.029 (0.040)
42Men FT Women FT Men RT Women RT
schooling3 0.020 (0.036) 0.121 (0.048)¤¤ 0.016 (0.036) 0.120 (0.049)¤¤
family2 0.597 (0.023)¤¤¤ 0.838 (0.032)¤¤¤ 0.626 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.883 (0.032)¤¤¤
family3 0.598 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.697 (0.055)¤¤¤ 0.617 (0.045)¤¤¤ 0.697 (0.055)¤¤¤
family4 0.361 (0.095)¤¤¤ 0.597 (0.044)¤¤¤ 0.331 (0.098)¤¤¤ 0.608 (0.044)¤¤¤
family5 0.672 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.541 (0.031)¤¤¤ 0.689 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.555 (0.032)¤¤¤
child 0.195 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.186 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.192 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.191 (0.025)¤¤¤
parttime 0.051 (0.037) -0.104 (0.024)¤¤¤ 0.044 (0.037) -0.115 (0.024)¤¤¤
industry1 0.233 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.245 (0.073)¤¤¤ 0.240 (0.036)¤¤¤ 0.263 (0.073)¤¤¤
industry2 -0.172 (0.019)¤¤¤ -0.171 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.154 (0.020)¤¤¤ -0.174 (0.030)¤¤¤
industry4 -0.016 (0.019) 0.077 (0.024)¤¤¤ -0.020 (0.019) 0.080 (0.024)¤¤¤
industry5 -0.007 (0.023) 0.017 (0.028) 0.015 (0.023) 0.041 (0.029)
whitecollar2 0.182 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.092 (0.026)¤¤¤ 0.164 (0.021)¤¤¤ 0.062 (0.026)¤¤
occchange2 0.288 (0.018)¤¤¤ 0.214 (0.025)¤¤¤ 0.289 (0.019)¤¤¤ 0.219 (0.026)¤¤¤
quarter1 -0.050 (0.031) -0.061 (0.043) -0.067 (0.031)¤¤ -0.046 (0.044)
quarter2 -0.246 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.146 (0.037)¤¤¤ -0.234 (0.030)¤¤¤ -0.153 (0.038)¤¤¤
quarter3 -0.264 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.123 (0.035)¤¤¤ -0.259 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.102 (0.035)¤¤¤
quarter4 -0.119 (0.022)¤¤¤ -0.055 (0.032)¤ -0.113 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.053 (0.033)
quarter5 -0.002 (0.022) -0.060 (0.032)¤ -0.007 (0.022) -0.049 (0.033)
quarter6 -0.255 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.110 (0.036)¤¤¤ -0.249 (0.029)¤¤¤ -0.108 (0.036)¤¤¤
quarter7 -0.318 (0.027)¤¤¤ -0.125 (0.034)¤¤¤ -0.322 (0.028)¤¤¤ -0.111 (0.035)¤¤¤
motivationlack -0.108 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.050 (0.032) -0.097 (0.023)¤¤¤ -0.065 (0.032)¤¤
problemgroup -0.049 (0.040) -0.126 (0.060)¤¤ -0.056 (0.041) -0.086 (0.061)
_cons -6.307 (0.096)¤¤¤ -5.541 (0.121)¤¤¤ -6.336 (0.097)¤¤¤ -5.542 (0.123)¤¤¤
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